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53 
QUESTIONING THE NECESSITY OF CONCEALED CARRY 
LAWS 
William J. Michael∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The State of Ohio recently became the thirty-seventh state to pass 
some form of concealed carry legislation, under which persons may 
carry concealed firearms.1  Given the Second Amendment to the United 
States Constitution, such legislation appears unnecessary since 
individuals have a constitutional right to carry firearms.2 
WHOA!  A constitutional right to carry firearms?3  Based on the 
Second Amendment’s text, that is not at all clear.4  After all, as Nelson 
Lund has observed, the right guaranteed by the Second Amendment is 
not “self-evident[.]”5  In Sanford Levinson’s words, “[n]o one has ever 
 
∗ B.A. in Economics, The Ohio State University; J.D., The Ohio State University.  Mr. Michael is a 
litigator with Calfee, Halter & Griswold LLP in Columbus, Ohio. 
 1. O.R.C. § 2923.125 (2004) (allowing persons to apply for a permit to carry a concealed 
weapon as of April 8, 2004).  See generally, Clayton E. Cramer and David B. Kopel, “Shall Issue”: 
The New Wave of Concealed Handgun Permit Laws, 62 TENN. L. REV. 679 (1995) (discussing 
different concealed carry laws).  States’ concealed carry laws vary in their scope and the types of 
processes through which persons must go to legally carry a firearm. See NRA-ILA, Fact Sheet: 
Right to Carry 2004, available at http://www.nraila.org/Issues/FactSheets/ Read.aspx?ID=18 
(providing summary statistics of concealed carry laws by state: in two states, Vermont and Alaska, 
the right to carry a firearm is unrestricted; thirty-five states have laws under which the state must 
issue a permit if an applicant successfully completes the application process: Alabama, Arizona, 
Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, 
Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Nevada, 
North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South 
Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming; in nine 
states, the state may issue a permit: California, Delaware, Hawaii, Iowa, Massachusetts, Maryland, 
New Jersey, New York, and Rhode Island; in four states, a person may not carry a concealed 
weapon: Illinois, Kansas, Nebraska, and Wisconsin). 
 2. U.S. CONST., amend. II (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a 
free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”). 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Nelson Lund, The Second Amendment, Political Liberty and the Right to Self-
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described the Constitution as a marvel of clarity, and the Second 
Amendment is perhaps the worst drafted of all its provisions.”6  Michael 
Dorf has gone so far as to say that the Second Amendment “lacks a 
‘plain meaning[.]’”7  Further, according to Kenneth Lasson,  
the plain meaning of the Second Amendment should be clear to a 
reasonably literate reader of the English language—as it has been to 
the Supreme Court and virtually all other courts—which have 
concluded that the Amendment does not confer upon every citizen the 
right to own a firearm.8 
Also, the Framers themselves did not intend for individuals to have 
a constitutional right to keep and bear arms.9  And, innumerable scholars 
who do this sort of thing for a living and, presumably, are good at it,10 
 
Preservation, 39 ALA. L. REV. 103, 108 (1987).  Some scholars that ultimately come down on the 
side of an individual right to keep and bear arms concede that “confusion as to [the Second 
Amendment’s] meaning might be inevitable.”  David Harmer, Second Amendment Symposium: 
Securing a Free State: Why the Second Amendment Matters, 1998 BYU L. REV. 55, 64 (1998). 
 6. Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637, 643-44 
(1989). 
 7. Michael C. Dorf, Symposium on the Second Amendment: Fresh Looks: What Does the 
Second Amendment Mean Today?, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 291, 295 (2000).  Even if it had one, Dorf 
would not feel bound by it since, in his words, “contrary to conventional wisdom, constitutional 
doctrine typically trumps constitutional text . . . .”  Id.  Dorf is apparently not part of the 
“consensus” written about by Stephen F. Smith that holds text binding.  Stephen F. Smith, Activism 
as Restraint: Lessons from Criminal Procedure, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1057, 1086 (2002) (noting “the 
broad consensus that the Constitution itself (and, in statutory cases, the legislation that becomes 
law) is binding on judges.”).  See also H. Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original 
Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 903 (1985) (“The Philadelphia framers’ primary expectation 
regarding constitutional interpretation was that the Constitution, like any other legal document, 
would be interpreted in accord with its express language.”).  Such a consensus is not without 
justification, since the text is what is debated, voted on, and becomes law.  See generally ANTONIN 
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION (1997); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983); Randy Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 
(1999).  Further, adherence to text is part of our legal tradition and was thought by the Framers to be 
of paramount importance.  See William J. Michael, The Original Understanding of Original Intent: 
A Textual Analysis, 26 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 201, 204-06 (2000) and accompanying citations.  Dorf 
himself concedes that “it is the text [of the Constitution] itself . . . that was enacted.”  Dorf, supra at 
302.  If the text was enacted but is not binding, why have a written Constitution? 
 8. Kenneth Lasson, Blunderbuss Scholarship: Perverting the Original Intent and Plain 
Meaning of the Second Amendment, 32 U. BALT. L. REV. 127, 157 (2003) (emphasis added). 
 9. See Daniel A. Farber, Disarmed by Time: The Second Amendment and the Failure of 
Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 167 (2000); Michael A. Bellesiles, Gun Laws in Early America: 
The Regulation of Firearms Ownership, 1607-1794, 16 LAW & HIST. REV. 567, 588 (1998); Paul 
Finkelman, “A Well Regulated Militia”: The Second Amendment in Historical Perspective, 76 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 195 (2000); Jack N. Rakove, The Second Amendment: The Highest State of 
Originalism, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 103 (2000); David Yassky, The Second Amendment: Structure, 
History, and Constitutional Change, 99 MICH. L. REV. 588 (2000). 
 10. But see Glenn Harlan Reynolds and Don B. Kates, The Second Amendment and States’ 
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have analyzed the Second Amendment and concluded that it does not 
guarantee an individual’s right to keep and bear firearms.11  One of the 
best scholars is so sure that the Second Amendment does not protect an 
individual’s right to carry firearms that he only briefly analyzes it . . . in 
a single footnote!12 
Then there is the courts’ interpretation of the Second Amendment.  
As the United States Department of Justice has written, “the Supreme 
Court and eight United States Courts of Appeals have considered the 
scope of the Second Amendment and have uniformly rejected arguments 
that it extends firearms rights to individuals independent of the collective 
need to ensure a well-regulated militia.”13  Even a former Chief Justice 
 
Rights: A Thought Experiment, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1737, 1765-68 (1995) (citations omitted) 
(“Although the states’ right interpretation has obtained very little in the way of scholarly support in 
journals that require footnotes, it has been widely circulated in the popular press, even by 
respectable scholars who should (and, one suspects, do) know better.”).  Daniel Polsby has written 
that “[t]he ‘collective rights’ theory seems to have flowered in the 1960s or 70s as a prop in national 
political debates about gun control laws.”  Daniel D. Polsby, “Second Reading: Treating the Second 
Amendment as Normal Constitutional Law,” REASON, Mar. 1996 at 32. 
 11. See, e.g., Dorf, supra note 7; Lasson, supra note 8; Carl T. Bogus, Race, Riots, and Guns, 
66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1365 (1993); Lawrence D. Cress, An Armed Community: The Origins and 
Meaning of the Right to Bear Arms, 71 J. AM. HIST. 22 (1984); Keith A. Ehrman & Dennis A. 
Henigan, The Second Amendment in the Twentieth Century: Have You Seen Your Militia Lately?, 15 
U. DAYTON L. REV. 5 (1989); Peter B. Feller & Karl L. Gotting, The Second Amendment: A Second 
Look, 61 NW. U. L. REV. 46 (1966); Andrew D. Herz, Gun Crazy: Constitutional False 
Consciousness and Dereliction of Dialogic Responsibility, 75 B.U. L. REV. 57 (1995); Ralph J. 
Rohner, The Right to Bear Arms: A Phenomenon of Constitutional History, 16 CATH. U. L. REV. 53 
(1966); Roy G. Weatherup, Standing Armies and Armed Citizens: An Historical Analysis of the 
Second Amendment, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 961 (1975); Wendy Brown, Comment, Guns, 
Cowboys, Philadelphia Mayors, and Civic Republicanism: On Sanford Levinson’s The 
Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 661 (1989); John C. Santee, Note, The Right to 
Keep and Bear Arms, 26 DRAKE L. REV. 423 (1977).  These scholars believe, in the words of Don 
B. Kates, Jr., that the Second Amendment was adopted to “place the states’ organized military 
forces beyond the federal government’s power to disarm, guaranteeing that the states would always 
have sufficient force at their command to nullify federal impositions on their rights and to resist by 
arms if necessary.”  Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the 
Second Amendment, 82 MICH L. REV. 204, 212 (1983).  Such scholars have been described as 
“[s]tate’s right theorists[.]”  E.g., Kevin D. Szczepanski, Comment, Searching for the Plain 
Meaning of the Second Amendment, 44 BUFFALO L. REV. 197, 201 (1996). 
 12. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 5.2, at 299 n.6 (2d ed. 1988). 
 13. Richard E. Gardiner, The Second Amendment and the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 29 N. KY. 
L. REV. 805, 805 (2002) (quoting Letter from Seth P. Waxman, Solicitor General, United States 
Department of Justice, to Robert D. Grace (Aug. 22, 2000)).  Gardiner goes on to analyze the 
courts’ decisions regarding the Second Amendment and concludes:  
A review of not only the cases cited by the Justice Department, but other cases decided 
by the federal appellate courts, reveals that those cases simply do not establish, as the 
Justice Department unambiguously asserted, that the federal appellate courts have 
‘uniformly rejected arguments that it extends firearms rights to individuals independent 
of the collective need to ensure a well-regulated militia.’  
Id. Notwithstanding the Justice Department’s position or Gardiner’s conclusion that it is wrong, 
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of the Supreme Court has opined, after he left the bench, that the Second 
Amendment does not guarantee an individual’s right to keep and bear 
arms.14 
Given this background, there is not even a constitutional right to 
have firearms, much less carry them. 
Balderdash!  In this article, I argue that the Second Amendment’s 
text guarantees an individual’s right (not a state’s right or a “collective” 
right) to keep and bear firearms.  Part I of this article contains that 
argument.  If the text is binding—and I believe it is15—further analysis 
regarding whether the Second Amendment guarantees an individual’s 
right to keep and bear arms is unnecessary.  Nonetheless, the original 
meaning of the Second Amendment confirms my reading of the text, as I 
show in Part II of this article.  In Part III of this article I go a step further 
and conclude that the scope of the individual right to keep and bear arms 
includes the right to carry concealed firearms. 
II.  THE SECOND AMENDMENT’S TEXT CREATES AN INDIVIDUAL RIGHT 
TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 
“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free 
State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be 
infringed.”16  Whether this text guarantees an individual right to keep 
and bear arms can be determined through a series of questions.  First, 
what is the right protected?  The “right . . . to . . . keep and bear arms.”17  
 
Judge Sam R. Cummings, Northern District of Texas, did not agree with the Supreme Court or the 
eight appellate courts in the decision he wrote in U.S. v. Emerson, where, after analyzing the Second 
Amendment’s text and history, he concluded that the Second Amendment does guarantee an 
individual’s right to keep and bear arms. 46 F. Supp. 2d 598 (N.D. Tx. 1999), rev’d, 270 F.3d 203 
(5th Cir. 2001). 
 14. Former Chief Justice Warren Burger, speech at a news conference introducing the Public 
Health and Safety Act of 1992 (June 26, 1992) (saying that the Second Amendment’s first clause 
must be read, “because a well regulated Militia is necessary to the security of a free State, . . .”); see 
also Warren Burger, “The Right to Bear Arms,” PARADE MAGAZINE, Jan. 14, 1990.  Daniel D. 
Polsby has written that Chief Justice Burger is “a judge not famous then or now as a constitutional 
authority and whose 30-year judicial career had in any case included not a single Second 
Amendment decision.”  Daniel D. Polsby, “Second Reading: Treating the Second Amendment as 
Normal Constitutional Law,” REASON, Mar. 1996 at 32.  Robert J. Spitzer came to the same 
conclusion as the former Chief Justice, however, reiterating that the Second Amendment “must be 
read as though the word ‘because’ was the opening word.”  Robert J. Spitzer, Lost and Found: 
Researching the Second Amendment, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 349, 350 (2000). 
 15. See Michael, supra note 7; William J. Michael, When Originalism Fails, 25 WHITTIER L. 
REV. 497 (2004). 
 16. U.S. CONST., amend. II. 
 17. Id. 
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Second, whose right is it?  It is “the right . . . of the people.”18  So the 
Amendment’s text reveals (without a great deal of difficulty, it would 
seem) what right is protected and whose right is protected.19  Although 
the meaning of “the people” has never been questioned in the First, 
Fourth, Ninth, or Tenth Amendments20 (“the people” are individual 
persons), it has in the Second.21  Scholars and courts have asserted that 
the Second Amendment protects states’ rights, or “collective” rights, 
rather than individual rights.22 
But collective rights are antithetical to the “familiar notion of 
individual rights in the United States.”23  “The very inclusion of the right 
to keep and bear arms in the Bill of Rights indicates that the framers of 
the Constitution considered it an individual right.  After all, the Bill of 
Rights is not a bill of states’ rights, but the bill of the rights retained by 
the people.”24  Further, since the amendments in the Bill of Rights were 
proposed and passed contemporaneously and, thus, should be read in 
pari materia,25 the phrase “the people” in the Second Amendment 
 
 18. Id 
 19. Id. 
 20. Levinson has written that the meaning of “the people” in the Tenth Amendment is 
“trickier” than the phrase’s meaning in other Amendments: “Concededly, it would be possible to 
read the Tenth Amendment as suggesting only an ultimate right of revolution by the collective 
people should the ‘states’ stray too far from their designated role of protecting the rights of the 
people.  This flows directly form the social contract theory of the state.”  Levinson, supra note 6, at 
645.  He goes on to point out, however, that “many of these rights are held by individuals.”  Id.  
“Moreover, since the Tenth Amendment explicitly differentiates between states and the people in 
terms of retained rights, the Amendment likely reserves rights to both the states and individuals.”  
Szczepanski, supra note 11, at 219 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
 21. See supra note 12 on scholars’ views, and the cases analyzed in Gardiner, supra note 13, 
for courts’ views.  What jurisprudence there is on the Second Amendment seems to be anomalous, 
since “[u]nlike cases involving the other amendments, which usually focus on the outer margins of 
the rights they provide, the Second Amendment debate has not resolved the Amendment’s very 
purpose.”  Szczepanski, supra note 11, at 197 (italics added).  That is, courts and, often scholars, try 
to limit the Second Amendment’s reach rather than expand it, as in the case of other Amendments.  
See also Harmer, supra note 5, at 72 (In Larry Arnn’s view, if the Second Amendment were 
interpreted as broadly as the First, individuals would have the right to own nuclear weapons (citing 
Larry Arnn, “The Right of the People, Precepts” at 1 (Claremont Inst., Claremont, Cal.), June 26, 
1997)).  On the other hand, Lund has explained that one of the court decisions often cited to stand 
for the proposition that there is no individual right to keep and bear arms, U.S. v. Miller, 307 U.S. 
174 (1939), actually held “that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to keep and 
bear arms and thus rejected the untenable collective right theory.”  Lund, supra note 5, at 110. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Margaret Y.K. Woo, Biology and Equality: Challenge for Feminism in the Socialist and 
Liberal State, 42 EMORY L.J. 143, 183 (1993). 
 24. Harmer, supra note 5, at 60. 
 25. Patton v. U.S., 281 U.S. 276, 298 (1930).  See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 794 (7TH ED. 
1999) (“It is a canon of construction that statutes that are in pari materia may be construed together, 
so that inconsistencies in one statute may be resolved by looking at another statute on the same 
5
Michael: Questioning the Necessity of Concealed Carry Laws
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2005
MICHAEL.DOC 12/17/2004  12:04 PM 
58 AKRON LAW REVIEW [38:53 
should be read to have the same meaning as it has in other 
amendments.26  There is little doubt that “the people” in the First,27 
Fourth,28 Ninth,29 and Tenth Amendments30 means individuals.  Also, 
although many scholars have rejected the notion of an individual right to 
keep and bear arms, as mentioned earlier,31 recent scholarship analyzing 
the Amendment’s text and history has embraced it32—even (seemingly) 
Laurence Tribe.33 
 
subject”). 
 26. See Harmer, supra note 5, at 60 (“The Second Amendment refers to ‘the right of the 
people to keep and bear arms’—just as the First Amendment refers to ‘the right of the people to 
peaceably assemble,’ and the Fourth Amendment refers to ‘the right of the people to be secure . . . 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.”). 
 27. See Levinson, supra note 6, at 645; Trejo v. Shoben, 319 F.3d 878, 884 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(“The First Amendment protects an individual’s right to freedom of expression.”). 
 28. See Szczepanski, supra note 11, at 219; Pena-Borrero v. Estremeda, 365 F.3d 7, 10 (1st 
Cir. 2004) (“The Fourth Amendment guarantees individuals the right to be secure in their 
persons . . . against unreasonable . . . seizures of the person.”) (internal quotations and citation 
omitted). 
 29. See Kates, supra note 11, at 218; Hearn v. Internal Revenue Agents, 623 F. Supp. 263, 
268 (N.D. Tx. 1985) (“The purpose of the Ninth Amendment is to guarantee to individuals those 
rights inherent to citizenship in a democracy which are not specifically enumerated in the Bill of 
Rights.”) (citation omitted).  
 30. See Levinson, supra note 6, at 645; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) 
(“The Constitution does not protect the sovereignty of States for the benefit of the States or state 
governments as abstract political entities, or even for the benefit of the public officials governing 
the States. To the contrary, the Constitution divides authority between federal and state governments 
for the protection of individuals.”). 
 31. See supra note 12. 
 32. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE 
L.J. 1193 (1992); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131 
(1991); Randy E. Barnett, Foreword: Guns, Militias, and Oklahoma City, 62 TENN. L. REV. 443, 
451 (1995); Kates, supra note 11, at 257, 267-68; Levinson, supra note 6; Jeremy Rabkin, 
Constitutional Firepower: New Light on the Meaning of the Second Amendment, 86 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 231 (1995); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amendment, 62 
TENN. L. REV. 461, 466-71 (1995) (arguing that both the text of the Second Amendment and its 
historical underpinnings support an individual right to keep and bear arms); William Van Alstyne, 
The Second Amendment and the Personal Right to Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 1236, 1236-43 (1994); 
David E. Vandercoy, The History of the Second Amendment, 28 VAL. U. L. REV. 1007 (1994); 
David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying Second 
Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 551 (1991); Randy E. Barnett & Don B. Kates, Under Fire: The New 
Consensus on the Second Amendment, 45 EMORY L.J. 1139 (1996); David I. Caplan, Restoring the 
Balance: The Second Amendment Revisited, 5 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 31 (1976); Richard E. Gardiner, 
To Preserve Liberty—A Look at the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 10 N. KY. L. REV. 63 (1982); 
Lund, supra note 5; Robert E. Shalhope, The Ideological Origins of the Second Amendment, 69 J. 
AM. HIST. 599 (1982). 
 33. See Carl T. Bogus, The History and Politics of Second Amendment Scholarship: A 
Primer, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3, 18-20 (2000).  In an op-ed piece for the New York Times 
following the school shootings in Littelton, Colorado, Amar and Tribe hedged a bit, opining that 
reasonable and realistic gun controls pass constitutional muster.  Laurence H. Tribe & Akhil Reed 
Amar, Well-Regulated Militias, and More, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 28, 1999, at A31.  Nonetheless, as 
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In determining the meaning of “the people” based on the text, there 
remains the question of the Second Amendment’s first clause—“A well 
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State”—and 
its impact, if any, on the meaning of “the people.”34  Since, as described 
in the previous paragraph, the Bill of Rights is a list of individual rights 
that cannot be infringed, the conclusion must be that the clause is a 
description of why individuals have the right to keep and bear arms and, 
thus, has no impact on the meaning of “the people.”35  Such a reading is 
internally consistent with the text of the other section of the Constitution 
with a preamble—Article I, Section 8, Clause 8.  There, Congress is 
given the authority to “promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, 
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries[.]”36  Congress’s 
authority (its “right,” if you will) is in the second clause, and the end to 
which its authority may be put (a description of why it has the “right”) is 
in the first clause. 
Further, such a reading is consistent with the meaning of the other 
 
Lasson recently explained, current scholarship supporting an individual right to keep and bear arms 
has been written by “a new wave of formerly ‘liberal’ scholars who have jumped on the current 
anti-gun-control bandwagon.”  Lasson, supra note 8, at 129.  Daniel Polsby once described the idea 
of an individual right to keep and bear arms as “horsedung.”  Mike Royko, Guns and the 
Constitution, CHI. SUN-TIMES, March 20, 1981 (quoting Polsby as “describing this gun lover’s 
belief as ‘a lot of horsedung.’”).  But after actually looking at the literature, Polsby commented that 
“[a]lmost all of the qualified historians and constitutional-law scholars who have studied the subject 
[concur].  The overwhelming weight of authority affirms that the Second Amendment establishes an 
individual right to bear arms, . . .”  ATLANTIC MONTHLY, June 1994, at 13. 
 34. See Harmer, supra note 5.  This is the clause that proponents of the states’ rights theory 
hang their hat on.  See Szczepanski, supra note 11, at 197-98. 
 35. See Eugene Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 793, 807 
(1998) (breaking the Amendment’s clauses into “purpose” and “operative” clauses and arguing for 
the primacy of the “operative” clause—the right to keep and bear arms).  Dorf has asserted that the 
first clause’s impact on the Second Amendment’s meaning “would seem so obvious as not to need 
justifying were it not for academic efforts to minimize its weight.”  Dorf, supra note 7, at 301.  Yet 
he appears to concede that the first clause states the purpose of the right to keep and bear arms.  Id.  
The purpose of a right is a different issue than whose right it is.  If anything, the Second 
Amendment, by stating its purpose and then going on to secure for the people the right to keep and 
bear arms, demonstrates that the “Militia” is “the people.”  See Van Alstyne, supra note 32, at 1243-
44 (explaining that the “guarantee of the right of the people to keep and bear arms [is] the predicate 
for the other provision,” and that by “relating these propositions within one amendment,” the 
Amendment “derives its definition of a well-regulated militia in just this way for a ‘free State’: The 
militia to be well-regulated is a militia to be drawn from just such people (i.e., people with a right to 
keep and bear arms) rather than from some other source (i.e., from people without rights to keep and 
bear arms).”) (emphasis omitted); Polsby, supra note 10, at 34 (“the Second Amendment does not 
say, ‘A well regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, shall not be 
infringed.’”). 
 36. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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amendments in the Bill of Rights, which guarantee rights to individuals, 
not states or a collection of individuals.37  There is nothing in the 
Constitution’s text to suggest that “Militia” modifies the meaning of “the 
people” such that the phrase means something different in the Second 
Amendment than it means in the First, Fourth, Ninth, or Tenth.38  Too, 
this reading is consistent with the use of “Militia” in Article I, Section 8, 
Clauses 15 and 16.  Those clauses empower Congress to “call[] forth the 
Militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel 
Invasions[,]”39 and to “provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, 
the Militia. . . .”40  Both clauses presuppose that the militia exists before 
being called to defend the country and, therefore, individuals do not 
become a militia only when employed in defense of the country in an 
organized, military sense.  Contrary to Jack Rakove’s assertion that “any 
reader of Article I, Section 8 would find it hard to deny that the text 
there considers the militia not as an unorganized mass of the citizenry 
but as an institution subject to close legislative regulation[,]”41 that is 
exactly what the text in Article I, Section 8, clause 16 considers the 
militia—why else would it give Congress the authority to organize and 
discipline it? 
Additionally, since the power to maintain state militias is not 
delegated to the United States (obviously, they are state militias), that 
power is reserved to the states under the Tenth Amendment.42  Thus, if 
the Second Amendment were read to guarantee states the right to 
maintain an armed militia, it would be redundant of the rights reserved 
to the states under the Tenth Amendment.  Such a reading should be 
rejected because, for nearly two hundred years, it has been recognized 
that every word in the Constitution should be given some effect.43 
There are, of course, additional textual issues surrounding the 
Second Amendment.44  But as described above, the plain meaning of the 
 
 37. See supra, notes 24-33 and accompanying text. 
 38. As Justice Scalia has said, “It would . . . be strange to find in the midst of a catalog of the 
rights of individuals a provision securing to the states the right to maintain a designated ‘Militia.’”  
(emphasis in original) Scalia, supra note 7, at 137 n. 13. 
 39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. 
 40. U.S. CONST. art. I,§ 8, cl. 16. 
 41. Rakove, supra note 9, at 126. 
 42. U.S. CONST., amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States . . . are reserved 
to the States. . .”). 
 43. See, e.g., Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 342 (1816) (“[U]nless the state courts 
could sustain jurisdiction in such cases, this clause of the sixth article would be without meaning or 
effect . . . .”); see also Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 (1979) (rejecting the construction of a 
statute that would render a clause redundant or superfluous). 
 44. For example, what does “to keep and bear” mean?  What “arms” may be kept and borne?  
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Second Amendment’s text guarantees an individual right to keep and 
bear arms. 
III.  THE SECOND AMENDMENT’S ORIGINAL INTENT SUPPORTS THE 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS 
Debate over the Second Amendment’s text reveals that it was 
 
The discussion of these questions is infra Part IV.  Another question not directly related to the 
Second Amendment’s meaning is whether it has been incorporated through the Fourteenth 
Amendment to protect against state infringement of the right to keep and bear arms.  Lasson points 
to “the court’s” clear understanding that the Constitution in no way limits states from enacting and 
imposing their own restrictive gun legislation.”  Lasson, supra note 8, at 129; see, e.g., United 
States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886); Quilici v. Village 
of Morton Grove, 532 F. Supp. 1169 (N.D. Ill. 1981), aff’d, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982).  He also 
asserts that “nowhere in the Constitution are states limited from” passing gun-control legislation.  
Lasson, supra note 8, at 130.  Perhaps rejecting the incorporation doctrine outright, Justice Scalia 
has said that the Amendment “is no limitation upon arms control by the states.”  Scalia, supra note 
7, at 137 n. 13.  Harmer has conceded that the “federal courts have never exercised the authority 
Congress gave them under the Fourteenth Amendment to apply the Second Amendment to the 
states.”  Harmer, supra note 5, at 74.  Other scholars have concluded that the Second Amendment 
has been incorporated.  See, e.g., STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE 
EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT 109-23 (Independent Inst. 1994); Kates, supra note 11, at 
252-57; Van Alstyne, supra note 32, at 1241-44.  Further, there is not inconsiderable evidence that 
the Fourteenth Amendment was meant to incorporate the Second Amendment.  See Van Alstyne, 
supra note 32, at 1252; Stephen P. Halbrook, Congress Interprets the Second Amendment: 
Declarations by a Co-Equal Branch on the Individual Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 62 TENN. L. 
REV. 597, 598-99 (1995).  The extent to which the Second Amendment was incorporated is more a 
debate over the incorporation doctrine itself than the Second Amendment.  Either the doctrine is 
legitimate and founded in the Constitution, or it is simply a judicial construct without constitutional 
foundation.  If the former, all individual rights secured by the Constitution are incorporated.  
Otherwise, the doctrine immediately falls into the latter category since judges could pick and choose 
which rights are “important” enough to incorporate.  The Fourteenth Amendment’s plain meaning 
and history strongly suggest that constitutional rights are incorporated through the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause.  See generally, AKHIL AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND 
RECONSTRUCTION 166-69 (Yale Univ. Press 1998); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 101 YALE L.J. 1193, 1264-66 (1992).  See also Chase J. Sanders, Ninth 
Life: An Interpretive Theory of the Ninth Amendment, 69 IND. L.J. 759, 777 (1994) (citing MICHAEL 
K. CURTIS, NO STATE SHALL ABRIDGE: THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS 
(Duke Univ. Press 1986) and Robert J. Kaczorowski, Revolutionary Constitutionalism in the Era of 
the Civil War and Reconstruction, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 863 (1986)); Laurence H. Tribe, Contrasting 
Constitutional Visions: Of Real and Unreal Differences, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95, 102 
(1987) (stating that the substantive due process decisions “might better have been cast in terms of 
‘privileges’ or ‘immunities’ of national citizenship” under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment); Michael Conant, Antimonopoly Tradition Under the Ninth and 
Fourteenth Amendments: Slaughter-House Cases Re-Examined, 31 EMORY L.J. 785, 819 (1982) 
(“These privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States are found in the original 
Constitution, in the Bill of Rights, and in English constitutional protections of 1791 preserved by the 
Ninth Amendment.”); Thomas K. Landry, Unenumerated Federal Rights: Avenues for Application 
Against the States, 44 U. FLA. L. REV. 219, 223 (1992) (“The Privileges or Immunities Clause 
would provide a simple and direct textual basis for application of the Bill of Rights to the states.”). 
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meant to protect an individual’s right to keep and bear arms.  Madison’s 
original version of the Amendment, which he proposed to put in Article 
I, Section 9,45 read: “The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall 
not be infringed; a well armed, and well regulated militia being the best 
security of a free country: but no person religiously scrupulous of 
bearing arms, shall be compelled to render military service in person.”46  
The House committee to which Madison’s amendments were referred 
changed the clauses’ order, putting the Militia Clause first, and added 
“composed of the body of the people” after “militia.”47  The Senate 
eliminated “composed of the body of the people” from the Amendment 
and rejected a motion to add “for the common defense” after “to keep 
and bear arms.”48 
Madison’s outline for a speech regarding his proposed amendments 
indicates that he thought the amendments “relate [first] to private 
rights.”49  His proposal to put the Second Amendment in Article I, 
Section 9 further supports the conclusion that Madison viewed the right 
to bear arms as an individual right, since that Section is one of the few in 
the original Constitution that protects individual rights.50  That the 
 
 45. See 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 186-87 (1905); Lund, supra note 5, at 107 n. 9 (“ . . . Madison planned to insert it . . . into 
article I § 9, which is the principal ‘individual rights’ section of the original Constitution.”). 
 46. THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS: THE DRAFTS, DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS 169  
(Neil H. Cogan ed., 1997). 
 47. Id. at 170. 
 48. Id. at 174-76. 
 49. Notes for Speech in Congress [ca. June 8, 1789], in 12 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 
193 (Charles F. Hobson & Robert A. Rutland, eds., 1979).  Rakove discounts the importance of this 
note since it is a “terse inscription [that] stands alone, and is not explicitly linked to the right to bear 
arms; . . .”  Rakove, supra note 9, at 122.  Whether Madison’s note is terse and stands alone or not 
is irrelevant to determining if it reveals anything about the Bill of Rights’ original meaning.  The 
Constitution is a rather terse document, after all, and we do not hold that against it.  And it should 
come as no surprise that Madison’s note is not explicitly linked to the Second Amendment because, 
as suggested herein, there is little doubt that all the amendments making up the Bill of Rights were 
meant to protect private rights.  See supra notes 24-33 and accompanying text.  The Second 
Amendment was nothing special and, therefore, Madison had no need to “explicitly” link his 
comment to the right to bear arms.  Notably, John Adams opposed “arms in the hands of citizens, to 
be used at individual discretion, except in private self-defense, . . .”  6 THE WORKS OF JOHN 
ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 197 (Charles F. Adams ed., 1851) (emphasis 
added). 
 50. For example, Article I, Section 9 prohibits bills of attainder and ex post facto laws and 
protects the habeas corpus privilege.  U.S. CONST. art. I § 9.  It has been said that Madison’s 
proposal regarding where to locate a right to keep and bear arms does not “conclusively demonstrate 
its fundamentally private nature. . . .”  Rakove, supra note 9, at 123.  This point is absolutely right, 
but it is less compelling when it is acknowledged that few, if any, believe that Madison’s proposal 
(or, for that matter, any single aspect of constitutional history) conclusively demonstrates anything.  
The point of inquiring into constitutional history to find the text’s original meaning is not usually to 
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Senate eliminated “composed of the body of the people” after “militia” 
suggests there was no need for that language because a “militia” is 
necessarily “composed of the body of the people.”51  Also, that the 
Senate rejected a motion to add “for the common defense” after “arms” 
suggests the framers did not want to narrow an individual’s right to keep 
and bear arms only to those situations where the individual was 
providing for the common defense.52 
The context in which the Founders and Congress debated the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights also reveals that the Second 
Amendment was meant to protect an individual’s right to keep and bear 
arms.  The Founders were skeptical of standing armies53 and conscious 
of a government’s potential to become tyrannical.54  They believed that 
 
find any single bit of information that conclusively demonstrates a provision’s meaning.  Rather, the 
inquiry must often focus on the import of the totality of the constitutional history.  See, e.g., 
Levinson supra note 6, at 645-650. 
 51. When debating the Constitution, George Mason asked: “Who are the militia?  They 
consist now of the whole people, . . .”  JONATHAN ELLIOT, 3 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE 
CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 425 (2d ed. 1937).  Richard 
Henry Lee referred to a “militia, when properly formed, [as] in fact the people themselves.”  
RICHARD HENRY LEE, OBSERVATIONS LEADING TO A FAIR EXAMINATION OF THE SYSTEM OF 
GOVERNMENT PROPOSED BY THE LATE CONVENTION, IN LETTERS FROM THE FEDERAL FARMER TO 
THE REPUBLICAN 123 (Walter H. Bennett ed., 1978).  Madison wrote that the militia would be 
composed of “. . . citizens with arms[.]”  THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison).  Halbrook has 
explained:  
In recent years it has been suggested that the Second Amendment protects the 
‘collective’ right of states to maintain militias, while it does not protect the right of ‘the 
people’ to keep and bear arms.  If anyone entertained this notion in the period during 
which the Constitution and Bill of Rights were debated and ratified, it remains one of the 
most closely guarded secrets of the eighteenth century, for no known writing surviving 
from the period between 1787 and 1791 states such a thesis. 
Stephen Halbrook, To Keep and Bear Their Private Arms: The Adoption of the Second Amendment, 
1787-1791, 10 N. KY. L. REV. 13-39 (1982).  On this issue, see generally JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, 
TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-AMERICAN RIGHT (Harvard University 
Press, 1994); Kates, supra note 11, at 216-17; Anthony J. Dennis, Clearing the Smoke from the 
Right to Bear Arms and the Second Amendment, 29 AKRON L. REV. 57, 77 n. 91 (1995) (arguing 
that militias refer to virtually all adult male citizens and not to “select militias” analogous to 
standing armies).  Rakove has, appropriately, asked: “But how do we know that this senatorial 
editing was only stylistic and not substantive?”  Rakove, supra note 9, at 124-25.  Without the 
forgoing history and textual analysis described herein, the Senate’s deletion might be evidence that 
the Second Amendment’s drafters did not intend to include the people generally within the meaning 
of militia as used in the Second Amendment.  Id. 
 52. See supra note 51. 
 53. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 29.  (Alexander Hamilton).  In fact, one of the complaints 
against King George III, stated in the Declaration of Independence, was the King’s maintenance of 
standing armies.  THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 3 (U.S. 1776) (“He has kept among 
us, in times of peace, Standing Armies without the Consent of our legislatures.”). 
 54. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NOS. 12, 28 (Alexander Hamilton), NO. 19 (Alexander 
Hamilton and James Madison), NOS. 39, 46, 48 (James Madison). 
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an armed citizenry would protect against both.55  Further, many people 
in the late eighteenth century believed they had an individual right to 
 
 55. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 28 (Alexander Hamilton) (“the great body of the 
people . . . are in a situation . . . to take measures for their own defence . . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO 
46 (James Madison) (“citizens with arms in their hands” protect against government infringement; 
Americans possess “the advantage of being armed[.]”); Elliot, supra note 51, at 97 (Theodore 
Sedgwick declared that it is  
a chimerical idea to suppose that a country like this could ever be enslaved . . . .  Is it 
possible . . . that an army could be raised for the purpose of enslaving themselves or their 
brethren? or, if raised whether they could subdue a nation of freemen, who know how to 
price liberty and who have arms in their hands?) 
NOAH WEBSTER, AN EXAMINATION INTO THE LEADING PRINCIPLES OF THE FEDERAL 
CONSTITUTION (1787), reprinted in PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, 
PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788, at 56 (Paul L. Ford ed., 1971) 
(1888))  
Before a standing army can rule the people must be disarmed; as they are in almost every 
kingdom in Europe.  The supreme power in America cannot enforce unjust laws by the 
sword; because the whole body of the people are armed, and constitute a force superior 
to any band of regular troops that can be, on any pretence, raised in the United States.  
See also 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES sec. 1890, p. 746 (1833)  
The right of the citizens to keep and bear arms has justly been considered as the 
palladium of the liberties of a republic; since it offers a strong moral check against the 
usurpation and arbitrary power of rulers; and will generally, even if these are successful 
in the first instance, enable the people to resist and triumph over them. 
See generally Malcolm, supra note 51, at 176 (discussing the movement to continue the right to 
individually bear arms in England after the Reform Act).  Dorf has rejected the use of Federalist No. 
46 to support an individual right to bear arms, stating that “the armed resistance Madison 
contemplates in The Federalist No. 46 quite clearly occurs under the official aegis of the states—not 
by self styled patriots.  The founding generation’s conception of armed resistance . . . is probably 
best understood in federalism terms, . . .”  Dorf, supra note 7, at 311-12.  But as Volokh has pointed 
out, a right to bear arms appeared in state constitutions of the founding era, where it would have 
nothing to do with federalism.  Volokh, supra note 35, at 810-12.  Further, Madison seems to 
distinguish between state governments and the people, writing that “State Governments, with the 
people on their side,” would repel danger.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison) (emphasis 
added).  This suggests that state governments, as used in Federalist No. 46, have an existence 
separate from “the people,” since the people would be at state governments’ side.  Id. Also, 
Madison explains that  “citizens with arms in their hands” would be “united and conducted by 
[state] Governments . . . .”  Id.  Thus, to repel danger, armed citizens would come to state 
governments to be “united and conducted”—but they were already armed when they came.  Id.  
Dorf acknowledges Madison’s assumption that “the people” would have arms, but dismisses the 
assumption as “inaccurate” since, according to the authority he cites, not many Americans of the 
time had guns.  Dorf, supra note 7, at 312.  Dorf may be wrong about this.  See, e.g., Staples v. U.S., 
511 U.S. 600, 610 (1994) (“[T]here is a long tradition of widespread lawful gun ownership by 
private individuals in this country.”); Harmer, supra note 5, at 85 (“Arms were obviously necessary 
for self-defense in frontier America, where government-provided law enforcement did not exist.”).  
Whether the people were in fact armed is less important in analyzing the Second Amendment—and 
Federalist No. 46—than whether they had the right to be armed.  Dorf recognizes as much (albeit in 
another context, Akhil Amar’s assumption of universality of militia service) later in his article.  
Dorf, supra note 7, at 313 (“[It] could be argued this false assumption reflected founding-era 
ideology, and it is that ideology—rather than the facts as they were—that underlies the Second 
Amendment.”). 
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keep and bear arms.  Blackstone, influential on law generally and the 
law in the colonies specifically, wrote of the people’s right “of having 
arms for their defense.”56  On the eve of the Constitutional Convention, 
self-styled patriots objected to what they saw as acts of tyranny by 
Massachusetts and took up arms during Shay’s Rebellion.  Three years 
after the Second Amendment’s adoption, self-styled patriots took up 
arms against the perceived tyranny of the federal government in what 
became known as the Whiskey Rebellion. These rebellions, though 
warded off by the government, demonstrate that the people of the 
eighteenth century believed—consistent with the Founders’ beliefs57—
that they had a right to bear arms against tyrannical government.58  
Additionally, to the extent that “[i]n the eighteenth century the primary 
responsibility of the militia was not public defense but internal 
security[,]”59 and before “the emergence of the police, ordinary citizens 
would bring what arms they had in response to a ‘hue and cry’ or when 
serving on a posse comitatus[,]”60 this once again shows that “ordinary 
citizens” were armed and were expected to bear arms for reasons of 
security.61 
Polsby once asserted that “no ambiguity at all surrounds the attitude 
of the constitutional generation concerning ‘the right of the people to 
keep and bear arms.’”62  “To put the matter bluntly, the Founders of the 
United States were what we would nowadays call gun nuts.”63  Whether 
 
 56. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 139. 
 57. See supra notes 54-55. 
 58. Dorf and Lasson seem to suggest that, because these rebellions were shut down by the 
government, there was no popular recognition of an individual right to keep and bear arms.  Dorf, 
supra note 7, at 320; Lasson, supra note 8, at 156.  The contrary conclusion suggested here seems 
more consistent with the Founders’ belief in individuals’ right to rebel against government tyranny.  
See supra notes 54-55.  Also, the government’s move to protect itself during Shay’s Rebellion and 
the Whiskey Rebellion is not inconsistent with an individual right to keep and bear arms or the 
Founders’ belief in the right to bear arms in the face of government tyranny.  The Government has 
the right to protect itself.  See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4 (“The United States shall guarantee to 
every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against 
Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be 
convened) against domestic Violence.”). See also United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 94 (1922); 
U.S. v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (government has “longstanding right . . . to protect itself 
by stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this country. . . .”). 
 59. Bellesiles, supra note 9, at 581. 
 60. Dorf, supra note 7, at 322-23 (quotations in original). 
 61. See Id. at 323 (“On a narrowly originalist reading, this fact serves to highlight that arms 
possession by members of the militia was not a strictly military function in the sense of responding 
to external threats; it included protecting one’s self and one’s neighbors from all manner of 
threats.”). 
 62. Polsby, supra note 10, at 34. 
 63. Id. 
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they were or not, the historical record surrounding the debate over the 
Second Amendment’s text and the context in which the Founders and 
Congress debated the Constitution and the Bill of Rights reveals that the 
Second Amendment was meant to protect an individual’s right to keep 
and bear arms. 
IV.  THE INDIVIDUAL RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS INCLUDES THE 
RIGHT TO CARRY CONCEALED FIREARMS 
As described above, the Second Amendment’s text and original 
meaning demonstrate that the Amendment protects an individual’s right 
to keep and bear arms.  But what is the scope of that right?  What does 
“to keep and bear arms” mean?  What “arms” may be kept and borne? 
Szczepanski has concluded that the “exact scope of the individual 
right is not self-evident, and is not expressly defined in the 
Constitution.”64  This may explain why scholars on all sides of the 
Second Amendment debate immediately (or nearly so) analyze the 
historical record to divine the original meaning of the phrase “to keep 
and bear arms.”65  A more rigorous textual analysis of the phrase 
indicates that the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to 
carry concealed weapons. 
The Amendment protects two distinct types of conduct—keeping 
arms and bearing arms.66  To “keep” arms must be something different 
than to “bear” arms due to the disjunctive “and.”  The meaning of one is, 
therefore, partly a function of the meaning of the other.  “Keep” 
implicates passive, custodial possession—particularly read in 
conjunction with “bear,” which implicates more active conduct.  An 
example may be: “I keep my important documents in the black file 
cabinet.”  To “keep” arms, therefore, suggests having passive, custodial 
possession of them, as in keeping them in the house. 
 
 64. Szczepanski, supra note 11, at 203. 
 65. See, e.g., Id. at 220-23 (analyzing historical record and concluding that the Second 
Amendment is a limited right to keep and bear arms); Lasson, supra note 8, at 137-38 (analyzing 
historical record and concluding that the Second Amendment does not protect an individual’s right 
to keep and bear arms). But see Harmer, supra note 5, at 74 (regarding determining what arms 
might be kept and borne under the Second Amendment, proposing that “[p]erhaps the best test 
would be a simple two-part query based on the Second Amendment’s plain text.”). 
 66. See Oliver v. Oliver, 149 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Ky. App. Ct. 1941) (“In its conjunctive sense 
it is used to conjoin a word with a word, a clause with a clause, or sentence with a sentence, 
expressing the relation of addition or connection, and signifying that something is to follow in 
addition to that which precedes.”) (quotations and citation omitted).  Dorf, however, has written that 
“‘keep and bear’ appears to have been understood as a unitary phrase, like ‘cruel and unusual’ or 
‘necessary and proper.’”  Dorf, supra note 7, at 317. 
14
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“Bear,” as just stated, implicates more active conduct than “keep.”  
Since to “keep” arms must be something different than to “bear” arms, 
and “keep” implicates passive, custodial possession, “bear” suggests 
active, exhibitory use of arms; something more than custodial 
possession.  Examples may be: “He came bearing gifts” or “She bears a 
resemblance to my aunt.”  To “bear” arms, therefore, suggests active, 
exhibitory use of arms.67 
Reading “keep” and “bear” together, then, indicates that the right 
“to keep and bear arms” protects passive, custodial possession of arms 
and the active, exhibitory use of arms.68  The latter extends to carrying a 
concealed weapon.69 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Judge Cummings pointed out in United States v. Emerson that 
“[p]rotecting freedom of speech, the rights of criminal defendants, or 
 
 67. Lasson claims that “[a] person in the pursuit of game or target shooting might carry his 
rifle, yet it would never be said that he had borne arms.”  Lasson, supra note 8, at 137.  Someone 
better tell Mr. Webster.  WEBSTER’S NEW WORLD COLLEGE DICTIONARY (Random House, Inc. 3d 
ed. 1991) at p. 121 (definition of “bear” includes “to carry; bring.”).  Also, today we may not say “I 
called my congressperson to petition for a redress of grievances,” but we know what it means. 
 68. This reading may conflict with what some scholars have found to be the original meaning 
of “to keep and bear arms.”  Kates has explained that “contemporary statutory usage shows 
eighteenth-century writers using ‘bear’ only in reference to militiamen carrying their arms when 
mustered to duty” and, therefore, if the Framers had used only “to bear,” the Second Amendment 
would “protect the carrying of arms outside the home only in the course of militia service.”  Kates, 
supra note 11, at 219.  Thus, he concludes that an individual’s right to keep and bear arms is 
encompassed by “keep,” rather than “bear.”  Id. at 220.  The conflict may, in one sense, be of little 
substance since the result is the same—the Second Amendment protects an individual’s right to 
keep and bear arms.  On the other hand, Kates’ reading of the Second Amendment may not support 
a constitutional right to carry concealed weapons.  Dorf too points out that “the phrase ‘bear arms’ 
was most commonly used in a military setting, . . .”  Dorf, supra note 7, at 303.  Yet he concedes 
that “[t]his is not to say that people do not use the phrase to refer to individual firearm possession—
they do.”  Id.  He is right.  The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 provided that “[t]he people have 
a right to bear arms for the defense of themselves and the State.”  PENN. CONST. of 1776, § 8, in 8 
WILLIAM FINLEY SWINDLER, SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 279 
(1979).  This use of “bear” agrees completely with the use suggested here. 
 69. See Szczepanski, supra note 11, at 222 (“The phrase ‘keep and bear’ in the Second 
Amendment refers to the individual right not only to possess (‘keep’) arms, but also to carry and use 
(‘bear’) such arms.”) (emphasis in original).  Although some believe it a “logical conclusion” that 
reading the Second Amendment to protect an individual’s right to keep and bear arms would mean 
that individuals may keep and bear missiles or tanks or nuclear weapons, such a conclusion is 
anything but logical.  See Michael T. O’Donnell, Note, The Second Amendment: A Study of Recent 
Trends, 25 U. RICH. L. REV. 501, 503-04 (1991) (regarding the logical conclusion).  By the Second 
Amendment’s text, only arms that can be kept and borne are protected.  See Harmer, supra note 5, 
at 74; Kates, supra note 11, at 220 n. 62 (“Because what is being guaranteed is an individual right to 
keep and bear arms, the arms could only be borne if the ordinary individual could conveniently lift 
and transport them about with his body.”); Reynolds, supra note 32, at 478-80. 
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any other part of the Bill of Rights has significant costs—criminals 
going free, oppressed groups having to hear viciously racist speech and 
so on—consequences which we take for granted in defending the Bill of 
Rights.”70  Protecting rights under the Second Amendment is no 
different.71  Scholarship on the Second Amendment, unfortunately, often 
devolves into questioning authors’ motives and debate over the notion of 
a living constitution versus adhering to original intent.72  The former 
reveals a lack of substantive foundation for denying the existence of an 
individual right to keep and bear arms; the latter is not about the Second 
Amendment’s meaning, but the proper role of courts in our democracy.73 
As outlined in this article, the Second Amendment’s text and intent 
supports an individual right to keep and bear arms.  The Amendment’s 
text supports a constitutional right to carry concealed weapons.  But like 
any other right, the right to keep and bear arms is not absolute.74  
 
 70. Emerson, 46 F. Supp. 2d at 609.  Judge Cummings also went on to ask, “why do we not 
apply such consequentialist criteria to each and every part of the Bill of Rights?”  Id. at 609.  In 
response, Lasson says, “we do[,]” citing to the “separate but equal” doctrine and asserting that it 
was abandoned because found it was “unworkable.” Lasson, supra note 8, at 146.  One could 
conclude that Lasson has a rather pessimistic view, since many (including myself) would argue that 
the “separate but equal” doctrine was abandoned not because it was “unworkable,” but because it 
was unconstitutional. 
 71. See Lasson, supra note 8, at 127-28 (information regarding gun violence). 
 72. See, e.g., Id. at 129 (advocating the “long-accepted principle” that the Constitution was 
“designed to be an evolving document” that is “supposed to change with the times”); Herz supra 
note 11, at 67:  
The ultimate question must be, what do the words of the text mean in our time.  For the 
genius of the Constitution rests not in any static meaning it might have had in a world 
that is dead and gone, but in the adaptability of its great principles to cope with current 
problems and current needs.  The gun lobby’s broad-individual-right view falls apart in 
our time.  The passage of two centuries has brought wholesale changes in the 
composition of the well-regulated militia, and in the role of firearms in American 
society. 
Dorf, supra note 7, at 292-93 (“Original understanding is not the sole, nor even the principal, 
measure of a constitutional interpretation’s correctness.”).  Such critiques reveal a weakness in the 
argument of those opposed to gun ownership—if the text and history of the Second Amendment 
supported their position, they would not resort to the living constitution argument. 
 73. Another argument to limit the right to keep and bear arms is that “[v]irtually every other 
consumer product in the country is regulated as well.  Handguns are the most notable and lethal 
exception.”  See, e.g., Lasson, supra note 8, at 164.  The response to this argument is simple: there 
is no other “consumer product” that is protected by the United States Constitution. 
 74. See, e.g., Gardiner, supra note 13, at 818 (“[It] is a truism to say that there is no absolute 
right to possess firearms.”); Lasson, supra note 8, at 132 (explaining that “following ratification, the 
states continued to pass new laws that closely monitored gun ownership.”); Erwin N. Griswold, 
Phantom Second Amendment ‘Rights’, WASHINGTON POST, Nov. 4, 1990, at C7 (“[T]hat the Second 
Amendment poses no barrier to strong gun laws is perhaps the most well-established proposition in 
American constitutional law.”); Szczepanski, supra note 11, at 223 (“no right in the federal Bill of 
Rights is absolute.”).  See also Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 358 (2003) (“The protections 
afforded by the First Amendment, however, are not absolute, and we have long recognized that the 
16
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Nonetheless, concealed carry statutes appear to presuppose that 
individuals cannot carry concealed weapons but for the statutes.  As 
described herein, such a presupposition may be inconsistent with the 
Second Amendment’s text.  If it is, concealed carry statutes should be 
viewed as regulation of the preexisting, constitutional right to carry 
concealed weapons and, accordingly, should be subject to judicial 
scrutiny with the same level of vigor as any other statute regulating a 
constitutional right. 
 
government may regulate certain categories of expression consistent with the Constitution.”). 
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